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Reporters never open infected Wikileaks attachments

Since I've published my findings on malware in the GI Files Wikileaks file dumps and my subsequent attempts to encourage Wikileaks to label such malicious content , I've repeatedly been told by a variety of "Security Experts®" that no one will open infected attachments from email file dumps. I plan on writing a post on how assumptions about user behavior are frequently inaccurate, and how assumptions based on the behavior of Wikileaks researchers analyzing email dumps based on the typical behavior of normal email users is particularly prone to failure, but for now I'll just leave this here: Has anybody's InfoSec experts advised abt wisdom of opening WikiLeaks sound files? Are we all just downloading Russian malware like morons? — David Fahrenthold (@Fahrenthold) July 28, 2016

Fox News asked for my take on the DNC email dump

I was interviewed yesterday by Fox News science correspondent James Rogers. I was asked for my input on the distribution by Wikileaks of emails leaked from a Democratic National Committee email server earlier this month. The entire article, which includes quotes from a variety of infosec professionals, is now available here . If anyone is interested I might post my complete conversation with Rogers, where I talk in more detail about how the unlabeled distribution of email attachments from compromised email servers poses unique dangers to journalists, activists and researchers whose job involves reviewing each of those attachments. This article represents the most attention paid by US media to the significant dangers posed to Wikileaks users by the insecure review methodology in place prior to distribution of these files. Although major newspapers in Europe and the UK published my findings on malware within the GI Files, no major news outlets in the United States published those fin

Bash script to email new S3 bucket files as compressed attachments (UDPATED)

I've written a simple bash script that checks for new files in an AWS S3 bucket and emails any that it finds as a compress (tar.gz) attachment  - you can find it at my Github account under the name "S3-Filer-Mailer". I built it as a supplement for a contact form that relies on S3 as a back-end, rather than a php mailer or database. Using S3 for contact forms is attractive because it is so unattractive to spammers. There is no way to corrupt this sort of setup for spamming or to get hands on a database through the form, because it isn't connected to one. Why not use Amazon's Simple Notification Service (SNS) ? For one, AWS charges more for SNS than it does for S3 queries and downloads. For another, if this sort of functionality is available through SNS it is not clearly documented. Getting back to the topic of security, the script establishes two network connections - one a connection to S3 to retrieve the files, the other sending the email. The S3 connection

Email server using amavisd-new fails with (!)DENIED ACCESS from IP 1.2.3.4, policy bank ''

I have used ClamAV and Spamassassin for many years. I've had a less experience with Amavis (now amavisd-new), but I've decided to give it a try with a new mail server deployment I've been working on. As a reference for my install, I relied on the documentation provided by Amavis for integration with Postfix  as well as a somewhat-outdated but still-relevant walkthrough published by CentOS . Prior to integration with amavisd, Postfix worked fine. Similarly, I had no issues with Spamassassin on its own. But once I finished my install of amavisd-new, things quickly went wrong. Attempting to send messages to accounts hosted on my email server resulted in the following chaing of errors in my maillog: Jan 13 18:17:34 hostname amavis[31578]: Net::Server: 2016/01/13-18:17:34 CONNECT TCP Peer: "[192.168.1.1]:40209" Local: "[127.0.0.1]:10024" Jan 13 18:17:34 hostname amavis[31578]: loaded base policy bank Jan 13 18:17:34 hostname amavis[31578]: lookup_ip_

Hotmail is bouncing bugtraq mailing list emails from Yahoo

What really irks me about this is that I deliberately use gigantic, stupid MTAs like gmail and live mail to deliberately avoid this sort of garbage (deliberately). Those familiar with administrating large volume email can appreciate that you can perfectly configure your mail server and end up bounding all over the place because almost everyone with a mail server is not an actual email administrator and has no clue what they are doing. Email, like high school, is ultimately all about popularity . Even the least competent of email server owners will eventually get tech support to make sure google and microsoft can deliver to and receive from their Zimbra abomination. At least that's what I figured until I started getting bounces like the one below. It seems Microsoft has decided that Security Focus mailing lists are too dangerous. To step up the oddity of this policy, bounces only occur when the originating MTA is with Yahoo. I can receive email directly from securityfocus.com. I c

Malware discovered in the Stratfor email file dump provided by Wikileaks is not limited to torrents - curated content on the Wikileaks website also infected

Several months ago I identified malicious software contained within a torrent available for download from Wikileaks . The torrent was the most recent and most complete copy of what Wikileaks titled the "Global Intelligence Files" - a large trove of emails and attachments from defense contractor Stratfor. The story as it is widely understood is that former Lulzsec member and hacktivist Jeremy Hammond was involved in the acquisition of these files from Stratfor and provided them to Wikileaks. Among the many files included in the leak I have identified 18 that have malicious software; most of those are embedded within PDF and DOC files. Some of the attacks I discovered are old, others are less old. Only two of the 18 files are blocked from downloading using Google Chrome's malware protection service, for example. In a second post, I decompile one of these two (older) files using PE Explorer and Hex-Rays IDA to demonstrate how the file corrupts the Microsoft Connection Manage